

Draft Outline

Terms of Reference

Weapon Systems Acquisition Assessment Task Force

Background

- General statement about our acquisition system. From the AFMC/CC brief to CSAF: Despite world class performance—AMRAAM, C-17, F/A-22, Small Diameter Bomb—there are serious shortcomings in the way we conduct our acquisition process.
- A brief review of acquisition history from the 1970s era forward.
- A description of the current situation and that our system has been called into serious question. Examples: Tanker, FCS. We have an opportunity now to look at our acquisition process.

Objectives and Scope

- Use the “Path Ahead” chart from the AFMC/CC brief to CSAF as a starting point/guide for developing a proposed way ahead for improving AF acquisition.
 - Develop more rigorous program management training and accountability standards.
 - Program to realistic cost estimates.
 - Ensure the industrial base provides for adequate competition.
 - Ensure our contract awards allow appropriate oversight.
- Team of 8 – 10 handpicked with right background and experience.
- Target completion: August 2005. Final written report and out-brief.
- Reporting: Biweekly status checks between SAF/AQ, AFMC, and the team.
- AFMC/CC: “Don’t spend too much time on failures. Look at where we were successful in the current environment—then apply those same principles.”

Approach

- The Forensics of What Happened.
 - Distill all criticism of AF acquisition system: Senator McCain, SASC, DoD IG, GAO, etc.
 - Relate criticism to policy/governance interpreted correctly/incorrectly, followed or not.
 - Identify checks/balances that could have prevented real/perceived acquisition failures.
- Process & Oversight.
 - Adequacy of directives.
 - How are processes developed? Are they repeatable?
 - Are processes fully resourced? Are they standardized and consistently applied?
 - How do we build oversight into process versus layering it on top—integrated oversight?